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18.1  The Views of Antiquity 
 Starting two and half millennia ago in Greek antiquity and continuing to twenty- fi rst 
century paradoxes, the story of dualism – the mind-brain problem – has many varia-
tions but retains some common themes. One of the earliest natural- philosophical 
investigations of the mind can be found in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, epic poems 
thought to have been written in the seventh or eighth century BCE (Green and Groff 
 2003 ). While one assumes that Homer’s main intention was to write heroic poetry 
and not to describe a psychological theory, his work nevertheless contains some 
interesting insights into the precursors of Western theories of mind. First, the 
Homeric Greeks appear not to have had a cohesive conception of mind nor of body 
(Jaynes  1990 ); there are no terms in Homer for words comparable to “soul” or 
“mind” or “thinking” or “perceiving” (Russo and Simon  1968 ). Instead in the 
Iliad and Odyssey we fi nd terms such as  psyche ,  thymos ,  menos ,  phrenes , and  ate 
(Green and Groff  2003 ). 
 The word  psyche appears in the fi rst sentence of the Iliad. In both the Iliad and 
the Odyssey,  psyche is compared to a “phantasm” or  eidolon (Sandywell  1996 ). 
Like a phantasm,  psyches are capable of haunting people after they have departed 
the body, as Patroclus haunts Achilles until Achilles will properly care for Patroclus’ 
body. The  psyche is ostensibly useless while inhabiting a living body; it does not 
appear to engage in cognition, emotion, or will. The  psyche is the life-force of a 
thing and leaves the body when the body dies (Green and Groff  2003 ). After death, 
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the vaporous, dispassionate  psyche is exhaled and Hermes escorts it to Hades 
(Sandywell  1996 ). Two terms the ancient Greeks used to refer to what we now 
consider to be psychological processes are  thymos and  nous. Thymos , or  thumos , 
is the source of emotion, sometimes with a quasi-intellectual aspect, and is strongly 
connected to motivation and will; its physical source is the diaphragm (Green and 
Groff  2003 ). The term  thymos can be used to mean a particular impulse itself or, 
non- dualistically, the organ from which the impulse originated (Russo and Simon 
 1968 ).  Thymos departs the body upon death, but does not go to Hades as does the 
 psyche . Instead it appears to dissipate. Unlike the  psyche , non-human animals are 
said to possess  thymos (Green and Groff  2003 ). 
 The  noos , or  nous , is far more intellectual than the  thymos . It was said to be 
located in the chest. The  noos is somewhat similar to the mind or a product of the 
mind; it is not mentioned often in Homer’s work, likely because his heroic poetry 
was more concerned with warriors than thinkers. Although the term  noos cannot 
be translated literally as “the mind” it can refer to the organ of planning or to the 
capacity one has to plan or even to the plan itself. Avoiding or perhaps simply 
uninterested in a dualistic account, Homer does not distinguish between these uses; 
which one is intended at any given point is left for the reader to discern from context 
(Russo and Simon  1968 ). 
 Two other Homeric psychological terms are  menos and  ate. Menos is similar to 
 thymos , but carries with it a more narrow range of application:  menos is a divinely 
caused surge of battle prowess for a warrior who is on the verge of giving in to 
fatigue or despair on the battlefi eld, while  thymos applies to the source of emotions 
generally.  Ate is a kind of madness, and, like  menos , often has a divine cause. For 
instance, when Agamemnon eventually returns the slave girl to Achilles, Agamemnon 
says his action comes from an  ate caused by Zeus. In Homer’s time, attributing 
mental states to external forces such as the gods, was not uncommon. It was not until 
sometime after Homer (perhaps 650–600 BC) that people began to write as though 
they were self-responsible for their mental states (Green and Groff  2003 ). 
 It is interesting to note that in the Homeric epics, it is possible for a person to 
converse with the  thymos or  phrenes almost as one would speak with another person. 
In the Odyssey, Odysseus engages in what might fi rst appear to a modern reader to 
be a soliloquy about the perils of being lost at sea. As the apparent soliloquy contin-
ues, it becomes clear that Odysseus is not speaking to himself, but is instead engag-
ing in a conversation with his  thymos (Russo and Simon  1968 ). One could argue that 
a character in a Homeric epic does not engage in any activity in isolation; he is 
always in the presence of his  thymos ,  menos ,  ate , and so on. An Homeric character’s 
actions are not entirely his own – his hand can be stayed or his mind changed by the 
intervention of a god. Keeping these terms and concepts in mind, we can begin to 
frame a Homeric model of the mind, defi ned as follows (Russo and Simon  1968 ).
•  Mental activity is represented as an exchange between personifi ed concepts such 
as the  thymos. 
•  Mental activity can be started by forces external to the person, such as a god or 
another person. 
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•  There is no obvious distinction between organs, the activity of the organ or the 
products of the activity of the organ. 
•  Mental activity is comprehensible and visible. 
•  The “self” is defi ned in a series of exchanges with others. 
 Thales, the earliest of the pre-Socratic thinkers averred, ‘All things are full of 
gods’. 1 Indeed it has been argued that for these early thinkers the entire natural 
world was alive and vital. 2 How ‘mind’, ‘spirit’ or ‘subjectivity’ was related to 
 matter, let alone the body or brain, was not a problem, it was simply a state of 
affairs. Yet the way in which they were ‘attached’ differed substantially between the 
different schools of pre-Socratic philosophers. One might presume, on the basis of 
the fact that mind-body interaction was taken as obvious, that the problem of 
 substance dualism hardly intruded into the work of the greatest natural philosopher 
of the ancient world, Aristotle. Of course, such a suggestion requires some support, 
and a cursory discussion of other views is in order before we consider the Aristotelian 
view. Aristotle’s approach can and we think, should, be understood largely as a 
response to the views of those that came before him. 3 
 The pre-Socratic view that likely most infl uenced Aristotle’s own views (and 
happens to be in some ways similar to the views of the seventeenth Century 
 philosopher René Descartes 4 ) belongs to the Pythagoreans. A striking departure 
from the hero myths of the Iliad and the Odyssey, Pythagoras is said to have had his 
followers study the work of an Asian-infl uenced Greek philosopher-poet by the 
name of Pherecydes, who maintained that the fear of death is unfounded since we 
survive the death of our earthly bodies and experience a rebirth in different bodies. 
The purpose of life, the Pythagoreans thought, was to prepare the soul for a fi nal 
separation from material bodies in order to make the journey “home” to the ethereal 
plane. The nature of the soul, according to the Pythagoreans, was an immortal, 
immaterial divine entity that was roughly mathematical in nature (see Aristotle, 
 De Anima I; Apostle and Gerson  1991 ). Himself a mathematician, Pythagoras noticed 
that the truths of geometry were not perfectly manifested in the ever-changing mate-
rial/sensible world. Indeed, such truths were found only deep in the soul. The 
sensible world was an imperfect image of the divine world found within the soul—
for instance, harmony found in music represented the kind of harmony that the soul 
was capable of when it fi nally reached the divine-world. 
 Pythagorean metaphysics is a complicated business, but for our purposes we can 
focus on that which made its way to Plato, and from Plato to Aristotle. The kind of 
1
  Thales, as reported by Aristotle ( De anima , 411a7); in Kirk and Raven  1971 , 94. 
2
  Frankfort and Frankfort  1949 , 14: ‘primitive man simply does not know an inanimate world.... 
The world appears to primitive man neither inanimate nor empty but redundant with life…’. 
3
  See, for example (Apostle  1969 ),  Metaphysics A, wherein Aristotle critically surveys the views of 
his immediate predecessors. 
4
  It is worth noting that while the spirit (so to speak) of the Pythagorean view in some ways paral-
lels the spirit of the Cartesian view, there are important differences in both the physics and meta-
physics that inform the views. 
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dualism present in the Pythagorean conception of the world was what we will here 
call a “form-matter dualism.” According to Pythagorean metaphysics, the world and 
everything in it is made up of various ratios of  peras (form) and  apeiron (matter). It 
is from this dualism of form and matter that we can make sense of the soul’s nature. 
For the Pythagoreans, the soul was made up of “the fi rst  tetractys ” (the numbers, 
1, 2, 3 and 4, which together add up to the “perfect number,” or 10). The body, then, 
was composed of the point (1), the line (2), the plane (3) and the solid (4), which are 
the geometric correlates of the numbers. The soul possessed the powers of intellect, 
inferential knowledge, belief, and sensation. This seems to be the one of the fi rst 
times that the soul was equated with what we now take to be the mind 5 and is a view 
that Descartes will champion much later. What should be noticed is that despite the 
importance of the  separability of the soul from the body, their interaction is taken as 
a basic assumption. That there is a physical world and that it correlates to the mind 
can be accounted for, according to a Pythagorean, mathematically, as the correlate 
between ethereal number and its geometric manifestation. For them, this seems to 
suffi ce by way of an explanation. 
 Plato’s view regarding the soul can be seen as a systemization of the Pythagorean 
form-matter dualism, incorporating the contributions of Heraclitus and Parmenides 
(Duerlinger  2005 ). Plato’s account is notably less mathematical in nature than his 
Pythagorean predecessors, but the account of soul is strikingly similar. The soul itself 
is immortal, and this is guaranteed by the very essence of it (see Plato’s  Phaedo ; later 
Aristotle defends Plato’s approach to proving the immortality of the soul in  Posterior 
Analytics ). The soul, Plato famously argues, has three different parts: the intellectual, 
the spiritual, and the appetitive ( Republic IV) (Hamilton and Cairns  1961 ). Each part 
plays an important role in giving life to the body. The appetitive keeps the body alive 
but tends to be somewhat unruly; the spiritual seeks honor, glory, and is the source of 
the passions; the intellectual is charged with the role of keeping the other parts of the 
soul in check – it does all of the heavy lifting, so to speak, with regard to reason- 
based activity, refl ection, and so on. Plato suggests in the  Phaedo that the soul is most 
like the forms—that is, ethereal, timeless, immortal, and the object of true wisdom. 
In Plato’s  Timeaus it is argued that “tiny nails” connect the body and soul, a view that 
is reiterated, albeit metaphorically, in the  Phaedo (Hamilton and Cairns  1961 ). Still, 
such an account of the fastening of the soul to the body fails to provide an illuminat-
ing answer to how the form and matter interact. 
 In  Physics I 9, Aristotle attributes the view to Plato that mind and body are  essen-
tially different, and thus  cannot interact (Apostle  1966 ). Furthermore, in  Metaphysics 
A, Aristotle criticizes Plato for never offering an account of how the forms are able 
to interact with the sensible world (Apostle  1969 ). This point is important for  several 
reasons. First, we see here the introduction of the notion of the essence of a thing. 
Essentialism plays an important role in Aristotelianism and the Scholasticism that 
dominated Western thought for over a thousand years after Aristotle; some notion 
5
  Some scholars maintain that the accompanying creation doctrine is what Plato presents in his 
dialogue  Timaeus . Others, Duerlinger ( 2005 ) e.g., think that Plato himself adopted a view very 
similar to this Pythagorean view. 
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of essentialism even plays a role in Cartesian arguments for substance dualism. 
Second, understanding form-matter dualism is crucial for Aristotle’s hybrid account, 
wherein Aristotle  collapses the Platonic parallel form and matter worlds into one. 
Finally, this  parallelism of form and matter might be seen as a precursor to Leibniz’s 
famous doctrine of pre-established harmony—wherein the mind and body never 
actually interact; the universe is merely set up in such a way that the order of mental 
events directly parallels the order of the physical thus making it  appear as if physi-
cal and non-physical beings can interact. 
 All of these are more spiritual and/or philosophical accounts of the mind than 
they are scientifi c (although the distinction as we know it now between philosophy 
and science is a rather new one, relatively speaking). In Aristotle’s work we fi nd a 
view that, while still very far from current science, more closely squares with what 
we take to be the dominant approach today; his naturalistic approach is at least 
much closer to what we understand as scientifi c than those views that incorporate 
separate insensible worlds and the doctrine of rebirth. Indeed, “If, then, one 
means by “identity theory” simply the contention that what we call mind and its 
 manifestations are not separable from the body, surely Aristotle… subscribed to this 
theory” (Matson  1966 , 93). Although Aristotle was Plato’s student and thus inher-
ited much of Plato’s metaphysical baggage, an important difference between the 
two is that, while Plato did not seem to think that form and matter could interact (or at 
least did not have a plausible account of such interaction), Aristotle thought that all 
they did was interact. In fact, in Aristotelian terms, form cannot exist without 
matter, and matter cannot exist without form. 6 For Aristotle, the form provides the 
essence, or the nature of the thing, while the matter provides the physical stuff to be 
made into that thing. For example, what makes a tree an oak tree rather than a cow 
is that the physical stuff that makes up the tree possesses the form of an oak tree. We 
can come to know the features or characteristics of that tree by coming to know the 
features that defi ne what it is to be an oak tree. 
 This is relevant to Aristotle’s notion of the human soul. What kind of form that 
matter takes on will directly impact the nature of the mind present in the being who 
exhibits that form. Substantial forms, as Aristotle calls them, are the soul, and differ-
ent kinds of souls possess different parts, depending on what kind of form it is. There 
were three kinds of souls, those of plants, those of all animals including us and those 
specifi cally reserved for humans. In many cases the form does not provide for a soul, 
and thus there is simply no mind. Rocks, for example, do not have minds in the sense 
that we now think about it (although Aristotle does talk about rocks “wanting” to 
return to the earth, or fi re “trying” to make it back to the sun because these are their 
natural places). Like those before him, Aristotle maintained that the soul was what 
gave life to a creature. And like Plato before him, Aristotle thought that the soul was 
divided into parts. Depending on the kind of soul a being possesses, it may have 
some or all of the following parts: [1] the reproductive/nutritive part of the soul (present 
in all living beings) which serves to reproduce more beings like it as well as to 
6
  There is one notable exception to this general rule: God. According to Aristotle, the divine being 
is form itself, without matter. See,  Metaphysics Γ, Ζ, Η and Λ. 
18 Mind and Brain: Toward an Understanding of Dualism
360
nourish the body, [2] the sensitive-imaginative part of the soul (present only in 
 animals) is physically located in the sense organs of a living thing allowing for a 
creature to take in information about the world around it and to react. Do not let the 
term “imaginative” fool you, however; this refers not to fl ights of fancy, but rather to 
the ability to reproduce mental images of those sensory  experiences taken in the 
present or past. [3] Next is the desiderative-locomotive part of the soul. This part of 
the soul (present only in animals, including human animals) gives beings the ability to 
desire pleasurable sensations, and to seek to avoid those sensations that cause dis-
comfort; it also allows for the being to move around in an attempt to pursue or avoid 
such stimuli. [4] Finally, the intellective part of the soul (which exists only in humans) 
serves as the power of the soul to engage in rational refl ection. The Aristotelian 
 conception of the soul is rather directly refl ected in the fi rst systematic efforts to 
establish these functions in the brain, medieval cell doctrine (see Whitaker  2007 ). 
 For Aristotle, even though the soul has different parts, it is numerically single, 
albeit spread out throughout the body. The sensitive portions of the soul actually 
exist  in the sense organs and as such, it may appear that Aristotle is the closest of 
the Greeks to modern-day physicalist accounts of the nature of the mind. 7 However, 
such an assumption is not warranted. Aristotelian metaphysics are weird, and 
despite the actual physical location of the mind/soul in the body, there is still an 
important kind of dualism present in Aristotle’s work. At the very least, there 
remains a form-matter dualism (nearly all things are composites of form and  matter); 
there is still an important distinction between the material that makes a thing up (the 
material cause), and that which makes it what it is  essentially (the formal cause). 
So despite Aristotle’s proclivity for naturalism, and the collapsing of the patently 
 dualistic world-view of Plato and the Pythagoreans, there still exists an important 
dualism in Aristotelian natural philosophy. 
 Still, the dualism present in the Aristotelian system is not  obviously the kind 
of dualism philosophy professors teach to introductory students today. The kind 
of dualism taught in philosophy courses today more closely resembles developments 
derived from Renaissance philosophers (notably Cartesian substance dualism, or 
the more recently developed property dualism). Matson ( 1966 ) has argued that such 
a conception of dualism is entirely foreign to all the Greeks, and that maybe they 
(the Greeks) had the right idea. If Matson is correct, there is something instructive 
about the  kind of dualism present in Aristotle’s natural philosophy, even though that 
dualism is radically different from how we think of it today. If Aristotle and his 
Greek peers never considered the mind-body problem (or soul-body problem) in the 
way that we do today, it is not hard to see how something like his conception of 
the soul can lead to the conception we do grapple with today. 
 The break-up of classical civilization in the fi fth century CE that ushered in the 
so-called ‘dark ages’ into most of Europe was shortly followed by the emergence of 
a brilliant civilization in the Islamic Middle East. Although a great deal of the 
Islamic ‘golden age’ was based on Arabic translations of the major works of Greek 
7
  For a defense of the view that Aristotle did not consider the body and soul separate in any sense, 
see Matson  1966 . 
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antiquity, it also saw an independent development of early experimental science. 
One thinks of Ibn al-Haytham’s (known as Alhazen in the west) optics 8 as well as 
labor-saving technologies, especially those powered by water. With the post- 
Crusades’ translation into Latin of the major part of Arabic learning in the twelfth 
century  et seq , Arabic developments in natural philosophy, medicine and  technology 
were (re-) introduced into Europe. Concomitantly, during the later Middle Ages a 
reorientation away from the things of the next world towards the things of this 
world, slowly accelerated. Technologies based on human and animal muscle power 
slowly gave way to technologies based on wind and water power. 9 The concept of 
the inorganic, of effi cient rather than fi nal causes, increasingly took hold. 
18.2  The Medieval Perspective 
 Depending on our personal convictions, today we may consider mind to be  something 
distinct from soul (of course not everyone would speculate on either the existence or the 
contents of the soul). But for the medieval and Renaissance thinkers, mind and soul were 
intertwined and man’s soul was divided into parts roughly following the Aristotelian 
model, the Platonic model or a creative alternative. The diagram makers who repre-
sented medieval cell doctrine sometimes represented a three-part soul (Dryander, 
Reisch-Brunschwig) and sometimes a fi ve-part soul (a translation of Avicenna); some-
times the parts were divided in two, creating a six- component model (the 1503 Bologna 
drawing, Albertus Magnus) and sometimes each part represented a single function (see 
Whitaker ( 2007 ) for discussion). What concerns us here is the rational part of the soul: 
it comprises both of the other kinds of soul, but it adds reason and is not shared with 
plants or other animals. Rational soul, in all of its complex interpretations, is the nearest 
anyone came to the contemporary notion of mind (see Lewis  1964 , pp. 153–165). 
 Medieval scholars recognized that there needed to be some means for (rational) 
souls, which were considered immaterial, to interact with bodies. And they were not 
shy about proposing solutions. The picturesque solution presented by Alanus ab 
Insulis, a twelfth century French thinker and poet, was that “the soul is fastened to 
the body  gumphus subtilibus , ‘with tiny little nails’” (cited in Lewis, p. 60 as from 
Plato’s  Timaeus , 43a). 
 It was commonly believed that some sort of ‘subtle gumphus’ was required to 
bind body and soul together and if it was not going to be ‘tiny little nails’, then it had 
to be some other entity. As Lewis, put it, “this  tertium quid , this phantom liaison-
offi cer between body and soul, was called  Spirit or (more often) the  Spirits … The 
spirits were supposed to be just suffi ciently material for them to act upon the body, 
but so very fi ne and attenuated that they could be acted upon by the wholly immate-
rial soul” (p. 166–7). For example, in Timothy Bright’s sixteenth century  Treatise of 
8
 Al-Haytham’s  Optics was published about 1025 CE; see Sabra ( 1983 ,  2002 ). 
9
  White  1963 . White gives a number of reasons for the development of labour-saving technologies 
in medieval Europe, not least ‘the spiritual repugnance of subjecting anyone to drudgery’ (p. 291). 
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Melancholy (Bright  1586 ), the spirits are, “a true love knot to couple heaven and 
earth together; yea, a more divine nature than the heavens with a base clod of earth”, 
so that the soul is “not fettered with the bodie, as certaine Philosophers have taken 
it, but handfasted therewith by that golden claspe of the spirit” (Lewis, p. 167). 
 The other attempt to ease the ever-mounting worries about how the mind and 
body interact is the notion of ‘animal spirits’ which, as we’ve noted, was the medi-
eval cell doctrine solution, particularly popular from the fourteenth to the sixteenth 
centuries; this was the model that René Descartes chose to use. Lewis, a scholar of 
medieval literature and thought who rejoices in many of the peculiarities of the 
medieval worldview, emphatically draws the line here: “This doctrine of the spirits 
seems to me the least reputable feature in the Medieval Model. If the  tertium quid is 
matter at all (…) both ends of the bridge rest on one side of the chasm; if not, both 
rest on the other” (p. 167). 
 The diffi culties with substance dualism slowly came into focus during this period. 
At least from the time of Galen and possibly before, the status of these ‘animal 
 spirits’ present in the brain’s ventricles and (most believed and Descartes famously 
drew) in the nerves and blood vessels, was to say the least, ambiguous. Were they 
merely messengers from the ‘soul’ lodged in the ‘marrow’ of the brain or did they 
possess psychic qualities of their own? Vesalius, in the mid-sixteenth century, began 
to suspect that the watery fl uid in found in the ventricles was no more than, precisely, 
a watery fl uid, and speculated (in print at least) no further. 10 It was only with Descartes 
in the seventeenth century, inspired by the Copernican/Galilean revolution in natural 
philosophy toward which the long centuries of the medieval period had been headed, 
that a fi nal and complete separation of mind from body occurred. Descartes’ 
 L’Homme (Cottingham et al.  1984 ) treated the animal as an ‘earthen machine’, 
 animal spirits as no more than the spirits one might fi nd sold in any bar, while mind 
became, in Gilbert Ryle’s phrasing, ‘a ghost in the machine’ (Ryle  2002 ). 
 The medieval view of the mind-body problem is distinctly unsatisfying to the 
modern way of thinking, notwithstanding its representation of a componential mind 
with distinct geographic locations in the brain. With that background in mind, let us 
now turn to Descartes and his sharply drawn distinction between mind and body, 
without the complication of a tripartite soul and the mediation of a range of spirits, 
but crucially, with a clear guiding principle regarding the nature of ‘body’. This 
clarity will make it far easier for us to see why the Cartesian formulation of the 
mind-body problem is not the problem facing modern scientifi c inquiry. 
18.3  The Cartesian Formulation 
 Cartesian dualism is a rather clear concept: Mind and soul are one and the same 
substance, it is immaterial, and the essence of it is thought. Indeed, in a departure 
from the Aristotelian conception, Descartes denied that, properly understood, 
the “soul” could exist in anything other than a human. He wrote, “I do not admit that 
10
 Vesalius  1998–2009 , Book VII, Chapter 1, p. 624. 
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the powers of growth and sensation in animals deserve the name ‘soul’, as does the 
mind in human beings. This common view is based on ignorance of the fact that 
animals lack a mind” (letter to Regius, May, 1641) (Cottingham et al.  1991 ). On the 
other hand, physical bodies are a completely different substance, the essence of 
which is mere extension. Neither substance requires the other to exist (the mind can 
and eventually will exist entirely without physical body and vice versa). Cartesian 
physics, following the Aristotelian dictum that “nature abhors a vacuum,” main-
tained that the universe is a plenum, and as a result of this, only mechanical forces 
can and do move physical bodies. Perplexingly, on the Cartesian model the mind 
has the ability to move the body without apparent direct mechanical contact. 
Descartes famously ‘solved’ this problem by proposing that the pineal gland is the 
gateway from the body to the soul (and the soul to the body). 
 Descartes knew what  body (or  the physical , or  matter , or  material substance ) was. 
It was  res extensa , stuff that occupied, or had extension in space. He also knew how 
motion of such stuff could be effected. Motion had to be effected by direct contact 
with other stuff that occupied space. These two key properties of bodies sustained his 
mechanical view of the natural world; nature could be understood in just the way we 
might understand how a machine works. Just as Descartes’ contemporaries could 
appreciate the action of springs, cogs, and wheels that bring about the motion of the 
hands of a clock, so they could appreciate that the planets are pushed around the sun 
by a celestial fl uid, and so they could appreciate all natural phenomena. It is worth 
noting that the celestial fl uid was no different  in kind from any other physical stuff. 
All of the stuff that existed in the natural world had the same essence, extension. 
 All except mind. The essence of mind, Descartes maintained, was thought alone. 
From this, Descartes seemed to know that it did not occupy space and thus could not 
be subject to mechanical laws. Mind could plainly bring about motion (I decide to 
move a fi nger, and I do), but it could not do so by contact mechanics. It is this char-
acterization that makes most clear the mind-body problem. The contrast between 
body and mind in this formulation is thus sharply drawn. Body is everything 
extended, and everything behaves the way a machine behaves, everything except 
mind. So, mind-stuff and body-stuff must be distinct substances. This sharp distinc-
tion is what gives the Cartesian mind-body problem its crispness. Its wide accep-
tance is in large part due to its clarity, no doubt, but also to its consonance with our 
commonsense intuitions. The world was just the way it seemed to be; it had 
objects in it, bodies that moved in ways prescribed by the laws of mechanism, that 
is, via direct contact. 
 But the clarity of the distinction between mind and body is a dual-edged sword. 
The clarity of the distinction and the epistemological argument for the distinction 
(in Descartes’ Sixth Meditation) provided a clear challenge. Princess Elisabeth of 
Bohemia articulates the worry that becomes apparent when considering Cartesian 
mind-body interaction most acutely in her correspondence with Descartes. It is 
worth quoting in full. She says,
 I beseech you tell me how the soul of a man (since it is but a thinking substance) can 
determine the spirits of the body to produce voluntary actions. For it seems every deter-
mination of movement happens from an impulsion of the thing moved, according to the 
manner in which it is pushed by that which moves it, or else, depends on the qualifi cation 
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and fi gure of the superfi cies of the latter. Contact is required for the fi rst two conditions, 
and extension for the third. You entirely exclude extension from your notion of the soul, and 
contact seems to me incompatible with an immaterial thing. That is why I ask of you 
a defi nition of the soul more particular than in your Metaphysic—that is to say, for a 
defi nition of the substance separate from its action, thought (Letter to Descartes, 6 May, 
1643, in Atherton ( 1994 )). 
 Mind should not be able to move anything physical and yet it does. There can be 
no ‘tiny little nails’ to solve the problem, no superfi ne spirits, no hocus-pocus of 
the Medieval sort, but a mystery that is a consequence of a mechanical view of the 
world. Descartes never really had a clear or satisfactory answer for Elisabeth. 
Famously, he maintained that the soul is connected to the body at the pineal gland. 11 
How exactly it is that the soul interacts with the pineal gland Descartes tried to 
explain to Elisabeth, and plenty of scholars have since tried to make sense of his 
response to her. Unfortunately, like Plato before him, the best he could come up with 
was something of a hand-waving analogy and references to simple and ultimately 
unsatisfactory ideas. 
 Newton’s gravitational force shattered the mechanical worldview. A force does 
not occupy space and it moves objects without direct contact. So, the notion of body 
that stood in clear contrast to mind in the Cartesian formulation of the mind-body 
problem faced a new challenge with this new physical theory. According to the 
Cartesian Programme, the mind was of a fundamentally different kind than bodies. 
Despite the diffi culty of reconciling  how the mind interacted with the body, it was 
clear that it did. We could examine and understand mind and body separately; each 
one existed in a different domain of inquiry. When forces were introduced into 
physical theories, the hard and fast distinction between mind and matter was lost, 
and with it, its usefulness. In the new physics, body could be  res extensa or not, and 
so the contrast with mind, which previously was the only thing that was not  res 
extensa , had been consigned to oblivion.  Res extensa itself was not possible without 
the basic forces. As Priestley observed: take away the forces, and there would be no 
solid objects, not even an atom, as everything would be dispersed and there would 
be nothing left for the imagination to fi x upon. 
 The Cartesian mind-body problem was defl ated because ‘body’ had ceased to 
have the character upon which the problem was premised (it was also challenged on 
quite different grounds by La Mettrie ( 1748/1996 ) and Locke ( 1690/1975 )). Indeed, 
since the new science was dealing in forces, vacuums, and other kinds of things that 
were ‘impossible’ given the Cartesian world-view, there was no means of maintain-
ing the distinction between material and immaterial ‘substances.’ That is, built into 
the new ‘physical’ science were theoretical entities that did not occupy space and 
could effect movement across a vacuum without direct contact, eliminating any clear 
divide between mind and body. To put the point succinctly, the realm of what counted 
as physical, and thus within the purview of the physical sciences (or “natural 
philosophy”) was anything that entered theory and that evidence indicated was real. 
11
  See, for example, Letter to Meyssonnier, 29 January, 1640; to Mersenne, 1 April, 1640; and to 
Mersenne, 30 July, 1640. 
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18.4  What Does Mind-Body Dualism Mean Now? 
 It’s a matter of some perplexity why the expression  Cartesian dualism continues to 
have the sort of currency that suggests that the Newtonian revolution never occurred 
and that we are still basking in the psychological luxury of nature appearing to be 
just like our common sense dictates it should be. The once principled and clear 
divide between mind and body lost much of its justifi cation once the consequences 
of forces were taken on board. So, it does not seem reasonable that anyone today 
would subscribe to Cartesian dualism (where the view is understood as a  scientifi c 
hypothesis regarding the  essential and complete distinction between mind and 
body). However, the mind-brain problem is very much alive and well; that it remains 
a serious and interesting problem is well articulated in the delightful book  Mind, 
Brain and the Quantum: the Compound “I” by Michael Lockwood ( 1989 ). 
 And yet, although we plainly have no reason to create a physical-nonphysical 
‘substance’ divide, many proceed as if such a divide obviously exists. To illustrate 
this, we will take some examples from highly accomplished scholars who care 
deeply about language-brain relations. Pulvermüller ( 2002 ), for instance, is con-
cerned about the failure, as he sees it, of linguistics to translate itself into a plainly 
physical account, one based on neurons. Instead, recalcitrant linguists appear to 
think that “language theories must be formulated in an abstract manner, not in terms 
of neuron circuits”, excluding “explicit reference to the organic basis” of language; 
“for a scientist this may be diffi cult to understand”. This incomprehensible “linguis-
tic mentality” is comparable to that of a “scholar who studies stars but refuses to 
speak about their component substances and driving forces”. What is called for are 
“translations between the language of linguistic algorithms and that of nerve cells”; 
“a language theory at the neuronal level is required”, but linguists continue to 
neglect this need; “it is not enough to provide abstract descriptions of language 
phenomena; it is also necessary to spell out possible language mechanisms in terms 
of neuronal circuitry” (270–3). On Pulvermüller’s account, linguistics has failed to 
reduce itself to purely physical matter. However, his allegations assume a qualita-
tively unwarranted divide. On the physical side, he does not question the failure to 
translate neural accounts into the structures and structural relations of linguistic 
theory; however, on the abstract side, he proclaims the failure to express theory in 
physical (neural) terms. Apparently, the physical side is more real or at the very 
least, has some privileged status that the abstract side lacks. We see the same view 
in many others who think about how the language-brain problem can be resolved. 
To cite another recent example, “language researchers who fail to embrace biologi-
cal approaches will be increasingly left behind” (Margoliash and Nusbaum  2009 , 
510). Left behind! As the seventeenth century poet Henry Vaughn put it “They are 
all gone into the world of light / And [linguists] alone sit lingering here.” What 
seems to worry these authors is that core linguistic proposals are made uncon-
strained by developments in neuroscience (“Neurobioogy and Neuroethology” op 
cit, 505). Evidently, it never occurred to them that they might equally register angst 
that core neurobiological proposals are made unconstrained by developments in 
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linguistics. One side of the divide has been conferred a special status; this is what 
Noam Chomsky referred to as  methodological dualism . 
 Yet we have seen that since Newton, such a simplistic divide has no justifi cation. 
The ‘physical’, whatever that is, is not more real and has no privileged status at all; 
indeed, as argued in Beretta ( 2014 ) it has  no useful status. All we have are phenom-
ena in the world that present themselves to us, and we try to understand them as best 
we can; that is, we construct theories about them and test them. To the extent that 
these theories are currently not integrated with each other, we hope that one day our 
understanding will be such that integration will be possible. 12 But the physical- 
supremacy approach, a standard way of viewing the problem of language-brain 
relations, has its basis in a discarded model. The demand for physical explanation, 
and the attendant frustrations of those who divide the world up that way, as 
Pulvermüller, Margoliash, Nusbaum and many others continue to do, has many 
historical parallels, as we have seen (Beretta  2014 ). 
 In the light of the history of natural inquiry over the last few centuries, what are 
we to make of such concerns as Pulvermüller’s? Recall his view that linguistics is 
unacceptable for devising its theories in an abstract manner, by which he means 
‘not in terms of neuron circuits’, an approach that he judges would be diffi cult for 
a scientist to understand. However, physics, by all accounts, is a ghost fi eld (as 
Kline ( 1985 ) puts it); that is, physics is so abstract that ‘physical’ has no useful 
meaning; linguistics is abstract, another ghost fi eld, and so is neurobiology. Which 
is only to say what has become so abundantly clear since Newton that it is now 
commonplace: inquiry is governed by theories, however abstract, bizarre, absurd, 
etc., they may seem to be, so long as they agree with experiment, in other words, 
with our best attempts to acquire an understanding of aspects of nature. Thus, to 
assume that theory in one domain, which is allegedly  not abstract, in some sense 
yet to be explained, has a privileged status over theory in another domain, requires 
justifi cation; lacking any to date, the assumption is truly rather diffi cult to under-
stand, let alone accept. 
 But perhaps what is meant when many scholars refer to dualism today is that 
there is a problem that we all face: how to unify our theories of mind and our theo-
ries of brain. No one, least of all the present authors, could argue with that. Lest 
one minimize the problem, however, we do realize that the theory-unifi cation 
problem is an enormous challenge, the solution which some commentators (e.g., 
Nagel  1974 ; Chalmers  1995 ,  1996 )) believe may be beyond us, or “if it exists, lies 
in the distant intellectual future” (Nagel  1974 , 436). This is impossible to know, 
but it is a measure of the magnitude of the perceived challenge that it conjures up 
such pessimism among some of those who think deeply about the issues. It would 
12
  There are a number of theoretical debates continuing in the philosophy of mind. Dating back to 
J.J.C. Smart’s important ( 1959 ) paper “Sensations and Brain Processes,” there is the view that 
seeks a theoretical reduction of paradigmatic mental states to brain states, just as we are able to 
reduce lightning to electrical discharges. More recently, Kari Theurer and John Bickle ( 2013 ) have 
revived something of a mechanistic approach to the reduction of the mental to the physical. 
Lockwood ( 1989 ) suggests that the existence of what we refer to as consciousness presents yet 
another challenge to the common-sense view of matter, just as does quantum theory. 
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be misleading, however, to suggest that such pessimism is the dominant view in 
the relevant literature. 
 To return to our theory of language, mainstream linguistic theory makes no 
 mention of neurons. But it explains a vast range of phenomena more or less well, as 
the evidence is more or less compelling. That just happens to be the best anyone has 
been able to come up with, where it was possible to make progress. Where we do 
not seem to be able to make progress is by looking for inspiration in theory con-
struction from what we know about brains. Of course, everyone would hope that 
one day, if we understand more and more about language and more and more about 
brains, we will be able to see how the two theories can constrain each other. This is 
perhaps where many scientists would situate their views. But if we take the further 
step of dictating how theory construction should proceed, then our notion of dual-
ism is far from innocuous and it is also unwarranted. So far as we know, prior to 
Maxwell, no one berated those who tried to understand electricity for failing to 
frame their theories in terms of light or of magnetism, or vice-versa. The  assumption 
that one side of a theoretical divide has to conceive itself in terms of the other side 
of the divide apparently applies uniquely to mind-brain relations; that is, it is a relic 
of a defunct version of dualism that serves no useful purpose at all (see Chomsky 
 1995 for discussion). 
 Versions of dualism persist, not only in discussions that reject linguistic theory 
as “brain averse” (Churchland’s  2002 term), but also in discussions of ‘eliminative 
materialism’ and of qualia (Chalmers  1995 ), for example. We think that such views 
presuppose that there is some serviceable concept of ‘physical’ to which one can 
appeal. It would be interesting to know what characterization of ‘physical’ modern 
apologists for dualism have in mind. It would have to be something that can cover 
all objects that have extension, the fundamental forces (gravitational,  electromagnetic 
and nuclear), electric and magnetic fi elds, quantum electrodynamics, and so on. 
Thus, perhaps all that can possibly be intended by the modern usage of ‘dualism’ is 
that we have our best theory of some aspect of mind on the one hand and our best 
theory of brain on the other and that they do not seem to share any properties. If so, 
then that is probably a fair characterization of where we are at this juncture in our 
intellectual history. But if all that is meant by ‘physical’ is the best that human 
minds have been able to come up with, that is, best theories, then no principled 
divide with the mental can be at issue, as we have argued; what is then at stake 
amounts to nothing more than a familiar, but very complex, theory-unifi cation 
 problem. Thus, we can point to our theory of brain and we can believe that the brain 
does the mind’s work and wish that our theory of mind could match our theory of 
brain. But it doesn’t just happen because we wish it to, and there is no point in bela-
boring a theory of some aspect of mind because it does not frame itself around what 
we know about brains. 
 In this chapter, we have provided a glimpse of the differing views of dualism 
from antiquity to the present. We cannot possibly do justice to the full complexity 
of the issues that any discussion of dualism gives rise to. Rather than attempt to go 
into every nook and cranny of ‘if’ and ‘perhaps’ and ‘but’, we have instead  presented 
a particular view (one that readers might have encountered elsewhere, for example, 
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in the writings by thinkers such as the mathematician, Morris Kline, or the linguist, 
Noam Chomsky); this view rejects dualism on the grounds that there is no sustain-
able mental-physical divide since we lack any useful concept of ‘physical’ and have 
not had one since Newton proposed action at a distance. Inquiry into mind- brain 
relations, on this view, is a problem of unifying theories, not a problem of reducing 
mind to matter, or any other formulation of the problem that seeks to salvage 
dualism. We hope that this at least provides a clear perspective that might generate 
worthwhile discussion. 
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